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Justice
Brandeis condemnation was unequivocal (read quote at the end of page). Interlocking
directors amounted to corporate conspiracy, this is a collusive practice that strengthens
the cohesiveness among well-connected organizations.
Compared to cartels, trusts, Joint venture and licensing agreements,
interlocking directors are highly influential, fluid, relatively invisible and hence less
amenable to public scrutiny.
The pujo committee report which prompted Justice Brandeis commentary, resulted in
legislation, specifically section 8 of the Clayton Act, which forbids an individual to be
the director of two competitive organizations. The enforcement of the Clayton Act has been
weak, as several studies have shown breaches of Clayton Act.
Here is a summary of findings (based on research work on this subject by Johannes M
Pennings):
* Interlocking is highest in most concentrated industries (cream of the crop) i.e. those
most nearly resembling a monopoly
* Financial corporations avoid interlocks with non-financial corporations that are saddled
with debt, are capital intensive or non solvent. Exception, in some industries viz.
energy, financial interlocks and capital intensity are highly correlated.
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Introduction
Anti-Trust Laws
Interlocks
& Law
True Stories
Phil
Webb Sullivan
Suggested Books
(Under construction) |
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The practice of interlocking directors is
the practice of many evils.
It offends laws, both human and divine.
Applied to rival corporations, it tends
to the suppression of competition ...
applied to corporations which deal with
eachother, it tends to disloyalty
and violation of the fundamental law that
no man can serve two masters.
In either event, it tends to ineffencicy
for it removes incentives
and destroys soundness of judgment. It is
undemocratic for it rejects the platform:
A fair field and no favors- substituting
the pull of privilege for the push of manhood
Louis Brandeis, Ex. US Supreme Court Justice
(House of Representatives, Pujo committee report, 1913)
